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Abstract 
People who threaten to cause harm may actualize their threat or bluff. To manage the risk that 
harmful acts will be perpetrated, it is of great importance to recognize differences between 
threatening behavior that will and will not be actualized. In this paper we present what is, to our 
knowledge, the first study in which verbal threats are examined experimentally. We theorize that 
threats reflecting actual intentions come with implementation details (how one will actualize the 
threat), whereas bluffs linger in the formation of ideas (reasons why one poses a threat). In a 
mock-paradigm, participants (N = 181) were instructed to threaten a company over the phone 
and were questioned about their threat during the call. Participants were either instructed not to 
actualize the threat (bluffers), to actualize it only if the company would not meet their demands 
(conditional actualizers) or to always actualize the threat (decisive actualizers). It was found that 
bluffers and actualizers differed in the amount of ‘how’ details they provided. In contrast to our 
prediction, bluffers provided comparatively more details on implementation. Possible 
explanations for this result are discussed. 
 
Keywords: threat assessment, true and false intent, construal level theory, investigative 
interviewing 
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Taking Threats to the Lab: Introducing an Experimental Paradigm for Studying Verbal Threats  
 
On August 15, 1998, a car bomb exploded in the shopping center of Omagh, Northern Ireland. 
The explosion killed 29 people and injured another 220. The Real Irish Republican Army (Real 
IRA), a splinter group of the IRA, claimed responsibility for the attack. It was the deadliest 
attack in the Northern Ireland conflict. Strikingly, a warrant preceded the bombing. Half an hour 
before the explosion a man called the Irish television station and stated: “Martha Pope, bomb, 
Omagh town, 15 minutes”. At the time, the Real IRA used the code “Martha Pope” when 
warning the police in order to distinguish themselves from those who threatened with fake 
attacks impersonating the IRA. In the Omagh-case the perpetrators thus explicitly revealed their 
true intentions. However, usually, the receiver does not know whether or not the threatener will 
do harm. Hence, threats come with great uncertainty (Meloy, Hart, & Hoffmann, 2013a). To 
assess potential risks, it is important to detect markers of actual threats and bluffs.  
An actual threat is defined as a stated intention to cause harm that the threatener 
genuinely intends to carry out. We call people who express such threats actualizers. In contrast, a 
bluff is a stated intention to cause harm that the threatener does not intend to carry out. We call 
people who express such threats bluffers. In the present paper we introduce a paradigm to study 
threats experimentally. Using this paradigm we examine whether, and if so how, intentions to 
actualize threats manifest in the verbal content of threats. In other words, do actualizers verbalize 
themselves differently than bluffers do?  
Threat assessments 
The contemporary research on threats is dominated by case studies. Most of these studies 
identify warning behaviors or risk factors associated with (threats to commit) targeted violence 
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(Meloy, Hoffmann, Roshdi, Glaz-Ocik, & Guldimann, 2013b). Targeted violence concerns 
incidents where the perpetrator selects a target prior to his violent attack (Fein, Vossekuil, & 
Holden, 1995). Examples of targeted violence are stalking, acts of terrorism, school shootings or 
workplace violence. Warning behaviors and risk factors are markers that relate to, and in certain 
cases predict, targeted violence (Meloy & OToole, 2011). Factors found to increase the risk of 
violence committed by threateners are prior violence, substance abuse, limited education 
(specifically verbal skill deficits), untreated mental disorders, and hostile/suspicious interaction 
styles (Warren, Mullen, & Ogloff, 2011; Warren, Ogloff, & Mullen, 2013). These predictors 
largely resemble the risk factors that are common to non-threatening perpetrators of violence 
(Yang, Wong, & Coid, 2010). 
 In addition to these general and clinical characteristics, specific risk factors have been 
identified for separate domains of targeted violence. Directly communicated threats, for instance, 
have been found to be a rather robust predictor of violence in cases of stalking (Mullen, et al., 
2006), whereas many school shooters have been found to reveal their violent plans indirectly to a 
third party (e.g., friend, classmate) prior to the attack (i.e. leakage, OToole, 2000). Furthermore, 
psychotic symptoms such as delusional beliefs and disordered communication are strongly 
associated with persons who threaten and attack royal figures, politicians and celebrities (Dietz, 
et al., 1991; James et al., 2007, 2008). Especially persons with intense preoccupations with an 
individual, activity or idea, appear to be overrepresented in statistics on the harassment of public 
figures (i.e. fixation; Hoffmann, 2009). Actual attacks of public figures are often preceded by 
approaches in the form of inappropriate letters or visits (James, Farnham, & Wilson, 2013). 
Other suggested warning behaviors are acts of planning and preparation (Calhoun & Weston, 
2003), identification with military and weapons (Hempel, Meloy, & Richards, 1999), and an 
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increase in attempts to pursue the objective (i.e. intensity of pursuit; Hoffmann, Meloy, & 
Sheridan, 2013). For an overview of warning behaviors, see Meloy and colleagues (2013b).  
Two prominent insights have emerged from the work reviewed above. First, the 
likelihood of actualizing a threat of violence appears to be dependent on the situation and 
circumstances, rather than on the threatener’s personality (Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, & Berglund, 
1999). Second, most attacks are of a deliberate nature (Borum et al., 1999). Perpetrators form 
ideas, calculate, plan, prepare and try out along their way to actual violence. When such 
behaviors follow a sequential structure it is sometimes referred to as a pathway to violence (for 
specifc stages along this pathway, see Calhoun & Weston, 2003). This concept illustrates that 
targeted violence is the result of elaborate processes rather than impulses. Recognizing pre-attack 
behavior in an early stage is key to assessing threats (Fein et al., 1995). The prevailing approach 
to threat assessment is therefore to monitor patterns of thinking and behavior of those individuals 
who come to the attention of professionals (Meloy et al., 2013a). However, this individualized 
approach rests mainly on research examining cases that have gone wrong. This begs the 
question: how many individuals with similar behavior never caused harm? The answer to this 
question is important for assigning diagnostic value to warning behaviors. Furthermore, cases are 
generally analyzed in hindsight, and the findings are described rather than predicted from theory. 
We therefore argue that experimental research is needed to identify discriminative markers of 
actual threats and bluffs and, if possible, to provide a theoretical framework which may 
accommodate previous findings.  
Construal Level Theory 
One theory that may be particularly relevant to understanding threats is the Construal 
Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010). CLT was originally developed to explain how people 
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mentally represent past and future situations such as memories, speculations or plans. These 
mental representations are called construals. Construals vary in abstractness depending on the 
psychological distance to the self. Psychological distance is the subjective experience of 
something being close or far away from the self, the here, and the now (Trope & Liberman, 
2010). An event is psychologically distant when it transcends one’s immediate experience. That 
is, when the event is supposed to take place in the distant future, at a distant location, applies to 
other people and/or is uncertain to happen. For instance, the seminar your friend might attend 
next year in Dubai is more psychologically distant than the seminar you will attend tomorrow in 
your hometown. The CLT holds that construals become more concrete as psychological distance 
to an event decreases and, as a consequence, affect peoples’ thoughts and behavior in relation to 
that specific event (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). This hypothesis has been supported in 
numerous studies and the results seem robust across different types of psychological distance, 
settings, and samples (Soderberg, Callahan, Kochersberger, Amit, & Ledgerwood, 2014).  
The key difference between actualizers and bluffers is that the former intend to carry out 
their threat, whereas the latter do not. Although there is no clear line between actualizers and 
bluffers in reality (e.g., some might not have made up their mind yet), the literature suggests that 
all threateners find themselves on a pathway between an idea to cause harm and the actual 
implementation (Calhoun & Weston, 2003; Fein & Vossekuil, 1997). Their position on this 
pathway can change over time and situation (Meloy et al., 2013b). For instance, a man who 
stalks his ex-wife and plans to set her house on fire might refrain from doing so when he gets a 
new girlfriend. Thus, threateners vary in their psychological distance to an attack. According to 
CLT, actualizers should have more concrete mind-sets compared with those who are indecisive 
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or bluff. The question is then, how -if at all- does the level of mental abstraction manifest itself in 
verbal threatening behavior? 
One possibility is that actualizers and bluffers value the desirability and feasibility of 
their threat differently. Desirability concerns the valence of an action’s end state, whereas 
feasibility refers to the ease or difficulty of reaching the end state (Liberman & Trope, 1998). For 
example, one’s wish to live in a just world reflects desirability, whereas all actions taken to 
create a just world reflect feasibility. The distinction between desirability and feasibility 
corresponds with the distinction between ‘why’ and ‘how’ aspects of an event. These aspects 
have been examined in research on how people think about what they are doing, so-called action 
identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). ‘How’ aspects are concrete and specify how one will 
act (“I will disgrace the company’s image by leaking sensitive information to the media”). ‘Why’ 
aspects are more abstract and specify why one will act (“I will shame the company’s image 
because they treat their employers badly”). It has been theorized that people generally prefer to 
describe activities in terms of ‘why’, but shift to ‘how’ descriptions when ‘why’ information fails 
to guide subsequent action (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Specifically, research shows that people 
describe activities in more concrete, ‘how’ related terms when these activities are soon to happen 
(Liberman & Trope, 1998) and/or more likely to occur (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 
2006). The role of ‘how’ and ‘why’ representations have also been examined in relation to true 
and false intent (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; MacGiolla, Granhag, & Liu-Jönsson, 2013; 
Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2014). These studies are of particular relevance for the 
current context since threats can be seen as a specific form of intent. 
True and false intent  
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Gollwitzer (1999) proposed that ‘how’ thinking is crucial for achieving goals. He 
suggested that the mere act of goal setting (“I want to shame the image of the company”) is not 
enough to realize the goal. People also need if-then plans that specify when, where, and how the 
goal should be realized (“If they don’t change their policy immediately, I will contact the media 
and leak sensitive information”). Such if-then plans are called implementation intentions and can 
be seen as the operationalization of the desired outcome, the goal intention (Gollwitzer, 1999). 
Research shows that individuals who form implementation intentions more often initiate goal 
striving and achieve their goals (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Furthermore, individuals who 
have no goal intention are unlikely to form implementation intentions (Sheeran, Milne, Webb, & 
Gollwitzer, 2005). Implementation intentions might thus be unique for true intentions. To 
examine this hypothesis, Sooniste and colleagues (2014), instructed truth tellers to plan and carry 
out a neutral task (grocery shopping), whereas liars were told to plan and carry out a mock crime 
(hiding a USB in the shopping center). The latter group was further instructed to lie about their 
true intentions in case they were intercepted, and to use a cover story to withstand the interview. 
When questioned about their intentions, truth tellers provided more ‘how’ information than liars, 
and liars provided more ‘why’ information than truth tellers. These findings were replicated in a 
subsequent study using a similar paradigm (MacGiolla et al., 2013; see also Granhag & 
MacGiolla, 2014). 
Although threats essentially reflect intent, the results from past research cannot be 
directly applied to threats. Threats differ from the type of intentions studied so far in at least four 
critical aspects. First, the truth (not the lie) reflects higher criminal involvement. That is, 
actualizers have criminal plans whereas bluffers have less malicious intentions. In previous 
studies on true and false intentions, liars typically held criminal plans and truth tellers were 
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innocent. Second, threateners emphasize their harmful intentions, whereas suspects commonly 
downplay or hide past actions. Third, no threatener is completely innocent. Making a threat 
(even with no intention to act upon it) is already harmful and sometimes criminal, depending on 
the severity of the threat and national legislation. The distinction between innocence and guilt is 
thus less sharp than in earlier intention studies. Fourth, implementation intentions are typically 
examined in social cognitive research as a condition that is either present or absent. This 
dichotomy might not hold for situations where intentions to implement violence may range from 
mild to moderate and strong intent. Hence, a new strand of research is needed to examine true 
and false intentions in relation to threats.  
The present study 
In the present study we examined how actualizers and bluffers verbalize threats. 
Participants were presented with a case involving a non-governmental organization (NGO) and a 
clothing company, and were then asked to represent the NGO when making a threatening phone 
call to the company. Participants were either instructed not to actualize their threat (bluffers), to 
actualize the threat only if the company would not agree to meet the participants’ conditions 
(conditional actualizers), or to actualize the threat no matter how the company would respond 
(decisive actualizers). A confederate answered the phone calls always using four different 
questions (see below). 
The likelihood that an event will happen affects how people think and talk about it 
(Wakslak et al., 2006). Specifically, ‘how’ representations of events become more prominent 
when events are more likely to happen, for instance, in near future plans (Liberman & Trope, 
1998) true intentions (MacGiolla et al., 2013; Sooniste et al., 2014) and implementation 
intentions (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). The likelihood of actualizing the threat was therefore 
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manipulated across the three experimental conditions: bluffers (low likelihood), conditional 
actualizers (medium likelihood) and decisive actualizers (high likelihood). It was predicted that 
decisive actualizers would provide the most ‘how’ information during the threat calls, followed 
by conditional actualizers, with bluffers providing the least ‘how’ information. Given 
Vallacher’s and Wegner’s (1987) theoretical notion that we are all sensitive to the larger 
meanings and reasons for what we are doing, no differences were expected with respect to the 
amount of ‘why’ information disclosed. 
Furthermore, interview tactics may affect how much and what type of information 
threateners provide. The questions asked during the phone call in the present study can be 
divided into two categories: information-seeking (e.g., Can you please give me more 
information?) and challenging (e.g., How do I know that you are telling me the truth?). No 
specific predictions were formulated for the effect of the specific questions on information 
disclosure, but the response patterns to the questions were examined for exploratory purposes. 
 
Method 
Participants and design  
One hundred and eighty one students (128 women, 53 men; Mage = 28.31 years, SD = 
10.05 years) at the University of Gothenburg (Sweden) participated in the study. Participants 
were recruited via the university participant pool. This pool consists of both students and non-
students who have signed up for participation in psychological research. Participants were 
approached via email and asked to take part in a study on campaigning strategies used by Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO). They received a cinema ticket for participation (worth 
approximately €11).  Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental 
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conditions: bluffers, conditional actualizers and decisive actualizers. Seven persons felt 
uncomfortable making a threat and withdrew from the study. Seventeen participants did not 
correctly follow the instruction to act or not to act on their threat. Eleven of these had 
misunderstood or forgot this part of the instruction, and six did not believe that they were truly 
supposed to follow through with the threat. Their scores were excluded from further analysis. A 
total of 157 participants thus remained: 54 bluffers, 51 conditional actualizers and, 52 decisive 
actualizers (108 women, 49 men; Mage = 28.10 years, SD = 9.67 years).    
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. The same case was presented to all participants. 
This case reflected a moral conflict between a fictive Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
named Aweare and a fictive clothing company named Vera. Participants read how Aweare was 
dedicated to improving working conditions in low-wage countries and how Vera was known as 
being socially engaged in the local communities in the countries to which they outsource their 
production. Vera had recently released a commercial in which they drew attention to violence 
against women. Meanwhile, Aweare got hold of video recordings showing how Vera exploited 
women in factories in Cambodia. Aweare considered it to be hypocritical that Vera raised public 
awareness about violence against women while simultaneously exploiting them for their own 
profit. Aweare therefore decided to take action against Vera. Participants were instructed to 
imagine being part of Aweare and to represent Aweare in this action.  
All participants were instructed to call a representative of Vera and to threaten that they 
would leak the video recordings with evidence of Vera’s malpractice to a Swedish television 
program for investigative journalism, if the company would not withdraw their commercial from 
television. Participants were either instructed not to leak the recordings (bluffers), to leak the 
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recordings only if the company would not agree to withdraw their commercial (conditional 
actualizers) or to leak the recordings no matter how the company would respond to their threat 
(decisive actualizers). All participants were left alone for 15 minutes to prepare for their task(s) 
and all had access to the same background materials. These materials included both ‘why’ 
related information (e.g., visions of Aweare, working conditions in Cambodia) and ‘how’ related 
information (e.g., delivery location for the recordings, name of the media contact).  
Next, the participants called the representative of Vera. They were led to believe that the 
person on the other end was another participant instructed to play the role as the representative. 
In reality, however, the recipient of the call was a confederate, who responded to the threats in 
the exact same manner, using four different questions/prompts:  
 
Q1. Hello, this is Caroline. I’m the head of Public Relations at Vera and I expected your 
call. You initiated this conversation, so please go ahead. 
Q2: I’m not sure I fully understand what you mean; can you please give me more 
information?  
Q3: How do I know that what you are telling me is true?  
Q4: Is there anything else I should know about before ending the conversation?  
Okay, let me think about this. Thank you for your input. Bye.  
 
After the conversation, the experimenter informed the participants that the Vera 
representative thought they were bluffing and therefore decided to ignore the threat. They were 
then instructed to proceed with their task according to the instructions. Bluffers were supposed to 
do nothing, whereas both conditional and decisive actualizers were supposed to provide their 
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media contact with a USB stick containing the video recordings. They were intercepted 
immediately after starting the implementation (e.g., put on their coat, walked towards the door). 
 Before the participants made the call, they rated nine statements on their involvement 
with the case (e.g., “I consider women rights and poverty reduction to be two of the most 
important priorities for NGO’s to focus on”, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and their 
motivation to perform their task (e.g., “I want Vera to believe that my threat is real”; 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree) using Likert scales. After the call and the interception, the 
participants rated the clarity of the instructions (“How easy/difficult did you find the 
instructions?”; 1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy), their satisfaction with the preparation time (1 = 
not at all sufficient, 7 = very sufficient), the amount of preparation time spent on preparing for 
the call (1 = no time at all, 5 = all the time), the amount of preparation time spent on preparing 
for the delivery (1 = no time at all, 5 = all the time) and the credibility of the set up (e.g., “To 
what extent did you believe that you would deliver the USB stick to a contact person”; 1 = very 
unlikely, 7 = very likely). Participants were then thoroughly debriefed, thanked and paid for their 
participation.  
Codings and data preparation 
All calls were transcribed verbatim and coding was conducted on these transcriptions. 
Two coders, blind to the conditions and the hypotheses, first identified ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
information in the background materials that participants had access to while preparing the call. 
The coders relied on Liberman and Trope’s (1998) distinction between desirability (why) and 
feasibility (how). All information that related to the operations of Vera, the operations of 
Aweare, the released commercial, and human rights in general was identified as ‘why’ 
information. All information that related to the video recordings, the delivery procedure, the 
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deliver location, and the possibilities to successfully implement the threat via investigative 
journalism or Aweare, was identified as ‘how’ information. In total, 44 pieces of ‘why’ 
information and 32 pieces of ‘how’ information were identified in the background materials. 
Each transcript was then coded for the amount of unique pieces of ‘how’ information (range: 32) 
and ‘why’ information (range: 44). Each piece of information was counted only the first time it 
was mentioned by the participant and repetitions were thus not taken into account. To assess the 
interrater reliability, one coder coded all the transcripts and the other coder coded 20% of the 
transcripts. The interrater agreement was 90 % (Cohen’s κ = .71).  
To explore at which point in time during the interview participants disclosed their 
information, a new dependent measure was computed for ‘how’ and ‘why’ information, 
respectively, using the following equation:  
 
𝑇𝑎𝑣 =  




where Tav =  the average time (within the interval ranging from Question 1 to 4) when the 
information was reported, ni = the number of pieces of information revealed at the ith question, 
and N = the total number of pieces of information revealed across all for questions. The measure 




Self-ratings on 7-point Likert scales showed that the participants believed in the setup (M 
= 4.96, SD = 1.07), were involved with the case (M = 5.59, SD = 0.77), and were highly 
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motivated to make a convincing threat (M = 6.25, SD = 0.92). Moreover, they did not find it 
overly difficult to comply with the instructions (M = 4.99, SD = 1.47), experienced sufficient 
time to prepare for their tasks (M = 4.53, SD = 1.72), which they had largely spent preparing for 
the threat call (M = 4.26, SD = 0.79, rated on a 5-point scale). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed no significant differences between conditions on the above measures. The only pre-
threat measure that showed differences between the conditions was the reported time spent on 
preparing for the delivery of the USB stick, F(2, 146) = 16.52, p <.001, ƞ² = .18. A post hoc test, 
using Bonferroni-corrected alpha levels, revealed that bluffers reported significantly less 
preparation time spent on the delivery (M = 1.20, SD = 0.06) compared with both conditional 
actualizers (M = 1.98, SD = 0.14, p < .001) and decisive actualizers (M = 2.02, SD = 0.13, p < 
.001). This finding can be seen as an additional manipulation check, as bluffers were not 
supposed to deliver the USB stick. When participants were asked in the debriefing to express 
their thoughts about the study, a substantial part spontaneously mentioned that they were nervous 
to make the call (48%), that the task was demanding (34%), and that the set-up felt real (26%).  
Hypothesis testing 
The distributions of both ‘how’ and ‘why’ scores were negatively skewed (skewnesshow = 
0.70, SE = 0.19; skewnesswhy = 1.63, SE = 0.19) and leptokurtic (kurtosishow = 0.64, SE = 0.39; 
kurtosiswhy = 5.53, SE = 0.39). Hence, we conducted non-parametric analyses to test our 
hypothesis. The descriptive statistics for each of the experimental groups are reported in Table 1 
(top panel).  
To test for the predicted trend across conditions, individual scores where ranked and 
analyzed using the Jonckheere test. A significant trend in the ‘how’ data was found. However, 
the conditions were ranked in opposite direction to what was predicted. The highest group 
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median was found for bluffers, followed by conditional actualizers and decisive actualizers, J = 
3300, z = -2.61, p = .009, r = -.21. In other words, the group that was least likely to actualize the 
threat (bluffers), was found to provide the most ‘how’ information. Follow-up analysis, using 
Mann-Whitney tests with a Bonferroni correction, showed that bluffers provided significantly 
more ‘how’ information during the threat call than did decisive actualizers, U = 971, z = -2.75, p 
= .006, r = - .27. No significant difference was found between bluffers and conditional 
actualizers (U = 1162, z = -1.38, p = .167, r = -.13) or between decisive and conditional 
actualizers (U = 1166.5, z = -1.06, p = .290, r = -.10). With regard to the amount of ‘why’ 
information provided during the threat calls, no significant difference between conditions was 
found using the Kruskal-Wallis test, X²(2, N = 157) = 0.56, p = .76, ƞ² = .00. 
Exploratory analyses 
To examine the point in time during the interview at which participants disclosed their 
information, we conducted a Kruskal-Wallis analysis on the average timing of information 
disclosure. To understand how this dependent measure was conducted, see “Codings and data 
preparation”. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 (bottom panel). The analysis revealed 
that the timing of disclosure of ‘how’ information differed between the conditions, X²(2, N = 
157) = 8.85, p = .012, ƞ² = .06. Pairwise Mann-Whitney comparisons, using Bonferroni-
corrected alpha levels, revealed that bluffers disclosed ‘how’ information significantly later in 
the interview than did decisive actualizers, U = 944.5, z = -2.91, p = .004, r = - .28. No 
significant differences were found between bluffers and conditional actualizers (U = 1127, z = -
1.60, p = .109, r = - .15) and between conditional and decisive actualizers (U = 1104, z = -1.47, p 
= .143, r = -.15). A similar pattern was observed for the timing of ‘why’ information. The point 
in time during the interview at which participants disclosed ‘why’ information differed between 
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conditions, X²(2, N = 157) = 11.58, p = .003, ƞ² = .07. Bluffers disclosed ‘why’ information 
significant later in the interview than did conditional actualizers (U = 917, z = -2.95, p = .003, r = 
-.29) and decisive actualizers (U = 943.5, z = -2.91, p = .004, r = -.28). No significant difference 
was found between conditional and decisive actualizers (U = 1346, z = .13, p = .895, r = .01).   
All interviews started with two information-seeking questions/prompts (Q1: “Please go 
ahead” and Q2: “Can you please give me more information”), followed by two challenging 
question (Q3: “How do I know that what you are telling me is true?” and Q4: “Is there anything 
else I should know about before ending the conversation?”). The patterns of change in responses 
from the information-seeking phase (Q1 and Q2) to the challenging phase (Q3 and Q4) differed 
significantly between the experimental conditions. More specifically, 44% of the bluffers 
revealed more ‘how’ information in the challenging phase than in the information-seeking phase, 
compared with 23% of the conditional actualizers, and 17% of the decisive actualizers, X²(2, N = 
157) = 9.67, p = .008, ƞ² = .06. Again, pairwise comparisons only revealed significant 
differences between bluffers and decisive actualizers (p = .007, r = .30). No difference was found 
with respect to ‘why’ information. Participants in all conditions showed similar patterns of 
change in their ‘why’ response. Only 2% of the bluffers, 2% of the conditional actualizers, and 
2% of the decisive actualizers revealed more ‘why’ information in the challenging phase than in 




We introduced a paradigm for studying threats using an experimental method and we 
reported the results of the very first study drawing on this new paradigm. The study provided 
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some support for the hypothesis that actualizers and bluffers use ‘how’ information differently 
when they threaten. Opposite to the predicted direction, bluffers revealed more details on how 
they would implement their threat, compared to those who were truly determined to act. This 
difference became particularly pronounced when participants were challenged. That is, when 
they were critically questioned (“How do I know that what you are telling me is true?”) or given 
a last opportunity to talk (“Is there anything more I should know about before ending this 
conversation?”). Overall, bluffers revealed more information later in the interview compared 
with the actualizers. The combined findings indicate that bluffers (vs. actualizers) more often 
resort to ‘how’ details when challenged. The results contradict previous studies in which detailed 
accounts on planning and implementation are generally associated with true intent (MacGiolla et 
al., 2013; Sooniste et al., 2014) and executing threats (Calhoun & Weston, 2003). The findings 
also conflict with the notion derived from the Construal Level Theory that the more likely it is 
that an event will happen in the near future, the more concrete (‘how’ related) this event will be 
construed and described (Wakslak et al., 2006). 
One explanation for the current results could be that the mental construals of threateners 
are overshadowed by strategic considerations. The hypotheses were based on the theoretical 
notion that people describe future plans in accordance with their mental representations of these 
plans. In other words, the more concrete the plans, the more concrete the descriptions of these 
plans. What we failed to consider, was how people choose to reveal or conceal information. 
Milburn and Watman (1981) proposed that threatening behavior is a social construct and that 
people rationally choose the content of threats in order to gain control in unpredictable situations. 
Hence, people might have deliberate ideas about when to provide what piece of information 
when they are questioned about threats. In other words, stated threats might be more colored by 
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what is best to say, rather than what is possible to say. As a result, participants that intended to 
actualize their threat might have had more ‘how’ details in mind compared to bluffing 
participants (as predicted in present study) but, more often than bluffers, chose to keep those 
details for themselves (as found in the present study).  
This explanation finds support in the literature on suspect interviewing. It has been found 
that guilty and innocent suspects differ both with respect to the degree to which they apply 
strategies during interviews, and the type of strategies they report to use (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007). Guilty suspects generally balance the risk of revealing incriminating details 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008) and tend to avoid to reveal information about criminal activities 
(Hartwig et al., 2007). Since the actualizing participants in the present study had intent to do 
harm, they might have adopted a guilty-suspect strategy. That is, withholding ‘how’ details to 
prevent being exposed. Bluffers, on the other hand, might not have worried too much about a 
successful implementation of their threat. Instead, the interviewer’s perception of their 
truthfulness may have mattered more. As liars typically do not take their credibility for granted 
(Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008), bluffers are likely to fear not being believed. Recent research 
shows that deceptive interviewees tend to alter their verbal strategies when they become aware of 
the possibility that there is evidence speaking to their guilt (Luke, Dawson, Hartwig, & Granhag, 
2014; Tekin et al., 2015). This threat to their credibility makes them either very forthcoming or 
very withholding. Hence, similar credibility concerns might have caused the bluffing threateners 
in the present study to become more forthcoming as the interview became more critical.  
Although we found significant differences with respect to verbal behavior of bluffers and 
decisive actualizers, the two groups did not differ from the conditional actualizers. This might 
have been due to our manipulation: The likelihood to actualize the threat (deliver USB-stick) 
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was manipulated between conditions. However, the likelihood to make the threat was the same 
for all three conditions (all participants had to make the phone call). Because participants were 
generally nervous for making the call and spent most of the preparation time preparing for this, 
less thoughts and effort might have gone to the actual manipulation (i.e. delivering the USB stick 
or not). If this was the case, the conditions did not differ too much from each other and we failed 
to manipulate the participants’ construals and subsequent behavior. To our defense though, 
differences between bluffers and actualizers might be small in real life too. Making a threat is 
probably demanding and nerve-racking regardless of the intention to follow it through or not. 
Differently put, if the mere act of threatening affects bluffers and actualizers to a similar extent, 
they might not differ markedly at first sight. Traditional deception research shows that people 
behave very similarly when lying and when telling the truth (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Hence, 
several lie-detection researchers now advocate developing interview techniques that elicit and 
enhance cues to deceit, rather than assuming that cues are present at face value (Vrij & Granhag, 
2012). The same reasoning might apply to research on threats. 
Further research 
The results of the present study cannot test the abovementioned assumptions on counter-
interview strategies of threateners. Hence, further research is needed to explore these theoretical 
notions. Interview tactics that challenge the threatener’s credibility, or interfere with successful 
implementation, might magnify differences in verbal behavior between actualizers and bluffers. 
Interviewing to elicit and enhance cues to deception is viewed as a promising strand of research 
(Vrij & Granhag, 2012). However, when applying traditional deception detection strategies to 
threats, a different interplay between interviewer and interviewee might arise. Key concepts such 
as guilt, innocence, truth and lies are cross-paired within threateners. In other words, threateners 
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are either innocent liars or guilty truth tellers. This is different than the typical lie detection 
paradigm in which the truth teller is innocent and the liar is guilty.  
Aside from interview tactics that may assist risk assessment, future research should also 
focus on interview tactics that may effectuate de-escalation. Today, threat assessment 
interviewing is primarily focused on information gathering, specifically, on the identification of 
risk factors (Van der Meer & Diekhuis, 2013). However, research on re-offending supports the 
view that violence risk is best managed when controlling for risk factors and when focusing on 
fulfilling the personal needs of the offender, for instance to arrange work that they enjoy 
(Andrews, Bonta, & Wormith, 2011). Such a combined approach is arguably relevant to the field 
of threat assessment as ignored desires (or at least desires experienced by the threatener as being 
ignored) often grounds threatening behavior (Calhoun & Weston, 2003). Ideally, the threat 
assessment interview offers an opportunity to reach out to the subject of concern. The 
importance of stabilizing the situation and creating a fruitful interview climate has been 
acknowledged in the field of threat assessment (Van der Meer & Diekhuis, 2013). However, 
evidence-based interview tactics to arrive at these conditions are currently lacking. Future 
research may profit from developing interview tactics that combine (a) the aim to gather 
information and (b) the aim to de-escalate the threat. 
Generalizability & practical applications  
The generalizability of the current findings might be limited by the overrepresentation of 
females in the tested sample. This ratio contrasts the samples in previous case studies where the 
threats were almost always made by males (e.g. Warren et al., 2011). As the case studies relied 
on actual data, the overrepresentation of males in the studied samples plausibly reflects a gender 
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asymmetry in the underlying population. It is therefore recommended to include more male 
participants in future experimental studies on threats.  
A second limitation for the generalization of the findings is the limited personal 
involvement in the threats made. Although participants in the current study reported that they felt 
involved in the case, that they were motivated to perform well, and that they experienced 
participation as real and demanding, an experimental setting remains artificial. Such setting 
obviously differs from the more complex circumstances in which threatening behavior 
commonly occurs (e.g., hostile world views, untreated mental illness, intense preoccupations; 
Warren et al., 2013). However, an exact resemblance of the real-world is not always needed to 
gain insight into a phenomenon. The experimental paradigm allowed us to examine the basic 
characteristics in statements of persons who threaten. Moreover, such a setting creates the 
opportunity to investigate what can be made to occur. That is, what can be said or done by a 
threat assessor to elicit more information from a subject of concern. This knowledge could then 
be used to develop interview tactics for threat assessors. Strategic interviewing has proven to be 
beneficial in other areas of investigative interviewing. Tactics were developed that successfully 
elicited cues to deceit in liars (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015), admissions from guilty suspects 
(Tekin et al., 2015) and information from sources who held knowledge about an upcoming crime 
(Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Cancino Montecinos, 2014). Thus, research on threat assessment 
interviewing may lead to protocols and tactics that help the threat assessor to elicit more, or more 
relevant, information.  
Furthermore, a better understanding of the communication of threateners and their 
counter-interview strategies may shed new light on current concerns for interviewing them, such 
as the subjects’ lack of insight into their own plans, their unwillingness to talk about their 
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situation (Meloy et al., 2013a), and judicial or practical difficulties (Van der Meer & Diekhuis, 
2013). However, before developing interview protocols for threat assessors, several protocols 
and tactics need to be tested under different conditions and in different contexts. 
Conclusions 
Taken together, this study is one of the first to address verbal threats experimentally. Its 
contribution is threefold; first, a new paradigm was presented in which the interaction between 
the threatener and the receiver could be examined. Although ecological concerns will always 
remain, this study showed that the basic aspects of threatening communication can be mirrored 
in a controlled setting. Second, our predictions were guided by theories on social cognition. 
Translating research from social cognition to threatening behavior could strengthen the 
theoretical base underlying the field of threat assessment (Milburn & Watman, 1981). Such a 
contribution should not be underestimated, considering that this field is currently short of 
theoretically driven predictions. Third, the results indicate that ‘how’ information may be of 
diagnostic value when assessing statements expressing threats. We did not directly test the 
effects of different interview protocols on threateners’ verbal behavior. However, our data 
suggest that differences between bluffers and actualizers may further increase as challenging 
questions are asked. This tendency could be the result of the threateners’ strategic concerns. 
Future research should therefore address i) what verbal strategies actualizers and bluffers adopt 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Amount (Top Panel) and Timing (Bottom Panel) of ‘Why’ and 












































































Note. The time variables correspond to the average point in time during the interview at which 
the information was revealed (1 = all information revealed at Question 1, 4 = all information 
revealed at Question 4). 
 
 
